where there are n possible outcomes of the course of action, the first outcome has utility ul and subjective probability tf¡1, and so on.
Although a number of psychologists have expressed some severe reservations about the merits of this model in the face of the data, it remains the dominant model for static decision-making to this day-although nowadays it is usually complicated by a stochastic formulation which causes it to predict a probability that one course of action will be preferred to another, rather than a choice. For reviews of this literature, see (Edwards, 1954d (Edwards, , 1961 (Irwin, 1953 [Edwards, 1962] ( Crandall, Solomon, and Kellaway, 1955; Irwin, 1953; Marks, 1951) . Some of the data from my probability preference experiments indicate more or less the same thing (Edwards, 1953 (Edwards, , 1954a (Edwards, , 1954b Edwards, 1953, p. 355 ).
like the 6/8 bet; these findings are highly reproducible. Figure 2 shows the same information for negative expected value bets. Here the outstanding finding is that people prefer relatively low probabilities of losing (and relatively high amounts of loss) and avoid relatively high probabilities of losing, and relatively small amounts of loss. These findings would be consistent with the hypothesis that people considered an event with a negative expected value to be less likely than the same event with a positive expected value, although of course they do not prove that hypothesis.
Another form of evidence comes from an experiment in which I actually obtained utility and subjective probability functions (Edwards, 1955 (Allais, 1953) . In 1954 I published an experiment addressed to the question, which concluded that variance preferences do indeed exist, but are minor in importance compared with utility and subjective probability as determiners of choices among bets (Edwards, 1954c) . More recently, Coombs and Pruitt have performed an experiment in which they asked subjects to make choices from pairs of imaginary bets of fixed expected value which varied in variance and in skewness (Coombs and Pruitt, 1960 
